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I.

INTRODUCTION

The only issue before the Court is whether services must be actually available at a
facility willing to accept and provide needed care to the Patient before those services can be
considered in determining what services "are the most cost-effective."

The Board of

Commissioners of Gem County (the "County" or "Board") has interpreted the Medical Indigency
Statutes as requiring it to deny the Patient assistance because Dr. Dammrose, a medical expert
for the County, expressed a clinical opinion that the Patient could have theoretically (but not
actually) been transferred to a lower cost facility at a certain point. The County argues that it is
bound by Dr. Dammrose's opinion and that Idaho law does not require any consideration as to
the availability of care when determining whether the services provided to the Patient were the
most cost-effective under Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18)A(e).
It is the purview of this Court to interpret Idaho law. Common sense, the language of the
statutes, as well as this Court's existing precedent, plainly require that the availability of
alternative treatment must be considered in determining whether the services provided were the
most cost-effective under Section 31-3502(1 S)A( e).
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

As noted in St. Luke's opening brief, the underlying facts of this case are undisputed.
Appellant's Opening Brief ("App. Op. Br.") at 2; Tr., p. 25, LL. 24-25 ("As the parties have
acknowledged, there's really no dispute of facts.").

However, the County makes certain

allusions, and in some cases certain direct statements, that are incompatible with the facts of the
case. St. Luke's rebuts those assertions below.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 1
40914.0131.11227791.l

A.

Response to Respondent's Statement of Facts.

The County argues that "[i]t is uncontroverted that the dates of care denied by the County
were not the most cost-effective service." Resp't Br. at 5. This assertion, as well as others the
County makes in its Respondent's Brief, has no factual basis in the record. The care denied by
the County~ the most cost-effective service because it is uncontroverted that such service was
the only service actually available to the Patient.
On January 26, 2016, the Patient was admitted to St. Luke's in critical condition. She
was found unconscious at her home and transported to St. Luke's where she was emergently
treated for brain lesions and meningitis.

AR at 318; Agency Tr., p. 4, LL. 6-17.

By

February 19, 2016, the Patient was medically stable enough that from a clinical standpoint she no
longer required the services at the level of a short term acute care hospital like St. Luke's. Tr.,
p. 26, LL. 22-25.

It is undisputed, however, that the Patient "could not have been simply

discharged home given her medical condition."

Id

It is further undisputed that from

February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, St. Luke's was the only facility that was available and
willing to treat the Patient. See App. Op. Br. at2-3, 12 & n.4; AR at 313, 316-17; Tr., p. 27,
LL. 2-5.

Thus, despite the County's unsupported assertion otherwise, the care provided by

St. Luke's from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016,

~

the most cost-effective service

because it was the only care actually available to the Patient.
Next, the County asserts that at the appeal hearing before the Board, one of the
Commissioners asked St. Luke's whether the care offered from February 19, 2016, to March 9,
2016, was billed by St. Luke's at the higher care rate. Resp't Br. at 2. The County then states
that "[t]he hospital admitted that there was less care provided but did not offer a reduced rate."
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Id.

This statement of fact by the County is incorrect. Indeed, the exchange cited to by the

County actually reveals the opposite:
Comm. Elliott: Yeah. I just have a question of interest. So during
the 20 days that [the Patient] did not need the higher rate of care,
was that care still administered at that rate and was it billed at that
rate?

Mr. Peterson: So, to answer your question, certainly the charges
were less than prior[.]
Agency Tr., p. 17, L. 6 - p. 18, L. 3.
The Commissioner then goes on to acknowledge that the care provided during the dates
in question was provided at a lower charged amount than when the Patient was in the ICU, and
queries whether the amount charged by St. Luke's was "close to matching" the amount that
would have been charged by Life Care. Id., p. 18, LL. 4-5. St. Luke's counsel responded that
he was unfamiliar with Life Care's charges but acknowledged that Life Care was a lower cost
facility than St. Luke's.

Id., p. 18, LL. 6-22.

St. Luke's, as it did before the Board,

acknowledges that the cost of care it provided the Patient cost more than the care the Patient
would have received at a lower cost facility if such a facility would have been available to the
Patient. However, an acknowledgment that an acute care hospital like St. Luke's is more costly
than Life Care is markedly different from the County's assertion that St. Luke's did not lower the
charges-St. Luke's clearly lowered the charges when the Patient's care became less intensive.
See Agency Tr., p. 17, L. 6-p. 18, L. 3.

The County also alludes throughout its brief that St. Luke's "decided" to "keep" the
Patient at its facilities. In particular, the County asserts that placement at Life Care "could have
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been, and in fact should have been, entered into in February. A lower level of care could have
been achieved much sooner and much more cost effectively as reiterated by Dr. Dammrose."
Resp't Br. at 7-8. The County further asserts that "St. Luke's seeks to be paid for their decision
not to transfer the Patient to a lower level of care at the time that it was appropriate," id. at 11,
and that "St. Luke's kept the Patient in its acute care facility for twenty (20) days beyond the
point where the Patient no longer required that level of care." Id. at 12. The suggestion from
these statements is that St. Luke's somehow made a deliberate decision to retain the Patient out
of some sort of financial motivation. Such an assertion is patently false and is unsupported by
the factual record. Notably, the County provides no citations to the record for these incorrect
factual assertions.
It is important to note that there is no dispute that the Patient could not be discharged

home. See Tr., p. 26, LL. 22-25 ("Both parties agree the [Patient] ... could not have been
simply discharged home."). Further, the record clearly shows that St. Luke's made extensive
efforts to place the Patient in a lower cost facility as soon as possible. App. Op. Br. at 2-3; AR
at 316. The reality is that the only facility willing to provide the ongoing care to the Patient was
St. Luke's. Id. In fact, the only reason why such a placement was ultimately successful was
because St. Luke's agreed to pay for the Patient's charges at a different facility. See Agency Tr.,
p. 10., LL. 16-25; AR at 320-25. Indeed, in the hearing before the Board, counsel for the
County acknowledged that St. Luke's acted appropriately.

Agency Tr., p. 20, LL. 5-6.

Additionally, at no point did Dr. Dammrose opine that there was a facility willing to provide the
lower level of care noted in his report. Dr. Dammrose gave a medical opinion about when the
Patient was clinically stable enough to be transferred to a lower level of care. He did not opine
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that there was such a facility willing to accept transfer of the Patient and provide the ongoing
care that the Patient still needed. AR at 24-39.
Finally, and most importantly, the only evidence in the record is that while St. Luke's
made multiple efforts to transfer the Patient, there were simply no lower cost facilities willing to
accept the Patient, due primarily to the lack of any confirmed health insurance or other funding
source. See App. Op. Br. at 2-3, 12 & n.4; AR at 313, 316-17. This is a fact not disputed by the
Board in its findings. AR at 11-13. This is also a fact acknowledged, and undisputed, by Dr.
Dammrose: "Due to her lack of insurance she was said to have no viable option for care." AR at
37. Thus, despite the County's allusions to the contrary, St. Luke's did not "decide to keep" this
uninsured Patient at its facilities in lieu of transferring her to a lower cost provider. Rather, the
facts clearly demonstrate that St. Luke's attempted to transfer the Patient as soon as possible and
even went as far as to pay for the Patient's care at a different provider in order to facilitate the
transfer sooner. Id.
The facts are undisputed.

Although the Patient no longer required the level of care

available at a short term acute care facility like St. Luke's, she still needed inpatient care and
could not be discharged home. See Tr., p. 34, LL. 19-22; Tr., p. 26, LL. 22-25. However, there
were no lower level care facilities that would accept the transfer of the Patient. See App. Op. Br.
at 2-3, 12 & n.4; see also AR at 313. Simply put, from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, St.
Luke's was the only facility willing to provide the care the Patient needed. Id. Any assertion or
allusion that St. Luke's made a "decision to keep" the Patient beyond February 19, 2016, or that
the Patient "could have been" transferred before March 9, 2016, is wholly unsupported by the
facts in the record and is not a finding of fact that was made by the Board.
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III.

ARGUMENT

The only question before the Court is whether services at a lower cost facility must be
actually available to the Patient before they can be considered in determining whether the
services provided to the Patient "are [sic] the most cost-effective" under Idaho Code Section 313 5 02(18) A( e). The County argues that the actual availability of services at a facility willing to
provide the care has no impact on whether the services provided to a patient "are the most costeffective" services available. Further, the County argues that if actual availability is considered,
there would be no limitation on what services hospitals could be compensated for.

For the

reasons discussed below, both of these arguments fail.

A.

The County Did Not Correctly Apply Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18) and
Therefore Acted in Violation of Statutory Provisions and Exceeded Its
Statutory Authority.

In arguing that the County correctly applied Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18), the County
asserts three basic points: (1) the language of the statute does not require the County to consider
actual availability of care. at a facility and it is not the County's responsibility to provide
alternative care; (2) the County is bound by what Dr. Dammrose opines; and (3) the Court should
not consider a case that interpreted a subsection of the same statute at issue here.
1.

The language of Section 31-3502(18)A(e) clearly requires that only those
services at a facility that are actually available to the Patient be considered
when determining medical necessity.

As an initial note, the County does not provide any authority for this sub-argument. See
Resp't Br. Part A. I at 7-8 (providing no citation to any cases, statutes or other relevant
authority). As such, the Court may disregard the County's arguments made under this section.

See Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 151 Idaho 266,278,255 P.3d 1152, 1164
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(2011) (declining to address issues raised by a respondent when respondent failed to support its
argument with legal authority or argument as required by I.A.R. 35(b)(6)); State v. Nickel, 134
Idaho 610,613 n.3, 7 P.3d 219,222 n.3 (2000) (same).
Moreover, the entirety of the County's argument in this regard is: "If the legislature
wanted to require the County to consider whether alternative service are actually available to the
hospital ... they could have put that in the statute." Resp't Br. at 7 (emphasis in original).
However, the legislature did just that. Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18)A(e) requires that the
services rendered "are the most cost-effective service or sequence of services[.]"
§ 31-3502(18)(e) (emphasis added).

LC.

As detailed in St. Luke's Opening Brief, the use of the

affirmative verb "are" clearly indicates a requirement that the services considered must be those
actually available to the Patient. See App. Op. Br. at 8-13. The County offers no rebuttal to this
argument. Further, even if the use of the affirmative verb "are" was ambiguous, the statute
should be interpreted to require that the services considered are actually available to the Patient
in order to serve the clearly stated policy of the Medical Indigency Statutes. See id. at 13-19.
The County offers no rebuttal to this argument either.
Instead, the County attempts to divert the Court's attention by making the unfounded
assertion that the Patient could have been transferred "much sooner and much more cost
effectively." Resp't Br. at 8. As detailed above, there is absolutely no factual support in the
record for this assertion.

Supra, Part II.A.

The uncontroverted facts show that while

Dr. Dammrose noted that a lower level of care was clinically appropriate, no lower level care
facilities were actually available to the Patient during the dates in question and only became
available when St. Luke's transferred the Patient to a facility willing to accept the transfer based
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upon St. Luke's voluntarily agreeing to pay for the Patient's treatment. See App. Op. Br. at 2-3,
12 & n.4. St. Luke's was under no statutory obligation to agree to pay for the Patient's treatment
at another facility. Nowhere in the Medical Indigency Statutes is a provider required to pay for
the necessary medical services of indigent patients. See I.C. § 31-3501 et seq. Conversely, the
purpose of the Medical Indigency Statutes is to "provide indigents with access to medical care
and to allow hospitals to obtain compensation for services rendered to indigents." Univ. of Utah

Hosp. v. Ada Cnty., 143 Idaho 808, 810, 153 P.3d 1154, 1156 (2007) (quoting Carpenter v. Twin
Falls Cnty., 107 Idaho 575, 582, 691 P.2d 1190, 1197 (1984)). By statute, the cost of providing
medical services to indigent patients falls on the counties. I.C. § 31-3501 (noting that one of the
purposes of the Medical Indigency Statutes is to "provide for the payment" of medical services
provided to the indigent); LC. § 31-3503(1) ("The county commissioners ... shall ... pay for
necessary medical services for the medically indigent[.]").
The County cannot escape this statutory responsibility by claiming that because certain
services at a more cost-effective facility were theoretically (but not actually) available to the
Patient, the services rendered by St. Luke's were not medically necessary. To do so not only
defies logic (by default, the only services available are the most cost-effective), but also places
the statutory burden clearly intended for the County onto the providers. The County's argument
that St. Luke's was somehow responsible for ensuring that the Patient's medical services were
paid for is unsupported by authority and is contrary to the clear language and policy of the
Medical Indigency Statutes.

1

The County's argument that hospitals would have no financial motivation for lowering a
patient's level of care because "they would receive compensation for the higher levels of care
whether that care was necessary or not," Resp't Br. at 8, is also unfounded. Clearly, the care
1

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 8
40914.0131.11227791.l

2.

The County is not required to follow Dr. Dammrose's legal opinion and, in
any event, Dr. Dammrose did not opine on the availability of lower cost
services.

The County attempts to escape liability for payment of the Patient's medical services by
arguing that the Board cannot authorize payment for "any service that utilization management
has determined to be 'not medically necessary.'" Resp't Br. at 9. In essence, the County argues
that, because Dr. Dammrose provided a clinical opinion that the Patient was suitable for a lower
level of care as of February 19, 2016, the County was bound by Dr. Dammrose's opinion and
could not authorize payment for the dates in question. Id. at 8-9. In support of this argument,
the County cites Idaho Code Section 31-3505B. Id.
However, Idaho Code Section 31-3505B clearly states that the determination of necessary
medical services rests with the County. Section 3 l-3505B states: "The county commissioners
shall approve an application ... if it [i.e., the County] determines that necessary medical
services have been or will be provided to medically indigent resident[.]" (Emphasis added.) The

statute clearly states that the County is responsible for making a determination of medical
necessity. It does not say an application shall be approved or denied based on the medical
advisor's legal conclusion regarding medical necessity. That the Board, not the medical advisor,
is responsible for making legal findings and conclusions regarding medical necessity is further
provided must be medically necessary. LC.§ 31-3503(1) (providing that the Board only has the
power to "pay for necessary medical services of the medically indigent[.]"). Medical necessity
requires that the services rendered "are the most cost-effective." LC. § 31-3502(18)A(e).
Accordingly, if a hospital retained a patient at a higher level of care when lower cost services
were medically appropriate and available, the hospital would not be entitled to compensation.
For example, here, had lower cost services actually been available to the Patient during the dates
in question, St. Luke's would not be entitled to compensation. However, that is not the case-it
is undisputed that services at a lower cost facility were not available to the Patient during the
dates in question-and the County's hypothetical and hyperbolic assertions otherwise do not
change the reality of these facts.
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buttressed by the fact that it is the County that is responsible for ruling on applications, not the
medical advisor. See LC. § 31-3505C ("[T]he county commissioners shall make an initial
determination to approve or deny an application .... ") (emphasis added).
Moreover, Idaho Code Section 31-3505F explicitly provides: "In the event that a county
determines that service is not a necessary medical service, a provider may submit the issue to a

panel for arbitration [.]" (Emphasis added.) This is a clear statement that the Board, not the
medical advisor, is to make the determination of whether a service is a necessary medical
service.

Section 31-3505F continues by outlining the arbitration processes, which includes

review of the County's determination of medical necessity by three qualified medical
professionals, and states: "No party shall be obligated to comply with or otherwise be affected or
prejudiced by the proposals, conclusions or suggestions of the panel ... however in the interest
of due consideration being given to such proceedings ... the applicable statute of limitations

shall be tolled" while the claim being arbitrated and for thirty (30) days after. LC.§ 31-3505F(2)
(emphasis added). This statement by the legislature makes it clear that a county can give "due
consideration" to a decision by the panel despite any prior medical advisor opinion. Put another
way, if the County was bound to follow the medical advisor's opinion, there would be no need
for the legislature to provide for an arbitration panel or for the County to give "due
consideration" to any decision by the panel because the County would already be strictly bound
by the medical advisor's opinion.
The County's argument that the Board does not have the ability to make findings and
draw conclusions regarding medical necessity independent of its medical advisor's clinical
opinion is simply unsupported by the relevant authority.

It should go without saying that
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Dr. Dammrose is not a legal expert and his interpretation of the Medical Indigency Statutes is not
binding on the Board.
Furthermore, Dr. Dammrose did not say that services at a lower level facility were
actually available to the Patient. Indeed, he did not dispute that the Patient's lack of insurance
created no viable alternative facility option. AR at 37. He noted that various facilities declined
to accept transfer of the Patient. AR at 36-38. Dr. Dammrose only offered his clinical opinion
that services at an acute care hospital like St. Luke's, from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016,
were not necessary from a clinical standpoint and that care at a lower level facility would have
been clinically appropriate. Id. Specifically, he determined that "the patient was medically stable
on 02/19 and it appears she no longer needed the services of an acute care hospital," and "[h]er
medical care was at maintenance level, and her needs were rehabilitative in nature." AR at 38.
St. Luke's does not dispute those clinical opinions. Missing, however, is any suggestion that a
lower cost facility was willing to accept transfer of the Patient. See AR at 36-38. The County
has not pointed to any evidence that there was a lower level provider actually capable and willing
to accept transfer of the Patient before March 9, 2016. This is because it is undisputed that care
at a lower level facility was not available to the Patient. See App. Op. Br. at 2-3, 12 & n.4.
Ultimately, while St. Luke's does not dispute Dr. Dammrose's clinical opinion that the
Patient was medically stable by February 19, 2016, St. Luke's does dispute the notion that the
Board is bound by any legal conclusion reached by Dr. Dammrose regarding what services are
"necessary medical services" as defined under the Medical Indigency Statutes.

Here,

Dr. Dammrose steps beyond his qualifications as a medical reviewer and interprets and applies
Idaho law. He cites the statutory definition of "necessary medical services" and concludes that
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the treatment at issue "is considered not medically necessary for purposes of payment." AR at
38.

However, Dr. Dammrose is not authorized to draw legal conclusions regarding the

Medically Indigency Statutes and the County cannot shirk its responsibility to determine medical
necessity by arguing that it is absolved from making findings and conclusions of medical
•

necessity because Dr. Dammrose said so.

2

The Board cannot abdicate its role as the fact finder in favor of Dr. Dammrose's
unsupported and mistaken legal opinion about what services constitute "necessary medical
services." Accordingly, to the extent the County is arguing that the Board did just that, the
Board violated its statutory duty to determine whether the services rendered by St. Luke's were
medically necessary and its decision denying assistance to the Patient for the dates in question
should be reversed.
3.

St. Joseph Regional Medical Center v. Nez Perce County is factually on point
and should be considered by the Court.

The County only dedicates one paragraph in an attempt to distinguish the current case
from the facts of St. Joseph Regional Medical Center v. Nez Perce County, 134 Idaho 486, 5
P.3d 466 (2000). See Resp't Br. at 9-10. This is likely because the County recognizes that there
is no way to convincingly distinguish the two cases. The County's only attempt at distinguishing
the two cases is to state: "This case can be distinguished from the facts in our case because the
court used this analysis in determining an applicant's eligibility for assistance, not whether
resources were available to the hospital." Id. at 10 (emphasis in original). Although somewhat
Although certainly not binding on the Court, a recent case in Twin Falls County confronted
a similar issue. See In re Med. Indigency Application of MS., Twin Falls Cnty. Case No. CV4215-2357 (Dec. 14, 2015), provided in the Record at pages 60-74. In that case, the district court
held that it was error for the county to rely on Dr. Dammrose's legal opinion interpreting the
definition of "emergency services." This case warrants the same result.
2
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unclear, it appears the County is attempting to distinguish St. Joseph on the premise that the issue
in St. Joseph dealt with the availability of resources to the patient rather than resources available
to a hospital. This argument, however, is fatally flawed because the question at hand is not
whether there was a facility willing to provide a lower level of care to St. Luke's (St. Luke's was
not in need of care) but, rather, whether there was care at a lower level facility available to the
Patient. Thus, despite the County's assertion otherwise, the focus of the current case is exactly
the same as in St. Joseph--can the County deny assistance on the premise that certain resources
or services are theoretically, but not actually, available to the Patient?
As detailed in St. Luke's opening brief, St. Joseph answered this question in the negative.
App. Opp. Br. at 21-22. Specifically, the court held in St. Joseph that in order to be considered
by the county for purposes of determining eligibility under the Medical Indigency Statutes, the
resources must be actually available to the patient. 134 Idaho at 490, 5 P.3d at 470. The court
then further held that because there was no evidence in the record that any of the services alleged
as available to the patient were actually available, the evidence did not support the county's
denial of the patient's application. Id.
There is no credible distinction between St. Joseph and the current case. The County
alleges that assistance should be denied because care at a lower cost facility was clinically
appropriate for the Patient. However, the only evidence in the record is that there were no lower
cost facilities actually available and willing to accept the Patient. See App. Op. Br. at 2-3, 12 &
n.4.

The only services available to the Patient for the dates in question were the services

provided by St. Luke's. Id. Indeed, the County does not even attempt to identify or otherwise
argue that there were services at a lower cost facility actually available, it simply asserts that
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availability of the services should have no bearing on the Board's determination of eligibility.
St. Joseph, however, clearly rebuts this argument-availability of services to the patient must be

considered by the board in making its determination. St. Joseph, 134 Idaho at 490, 5 P.3d at 470.
Accordingly, because the evidence in the record is that St. Luke's was the only facility
willing to provide care to the Patient (no lower level facility was willing to accept a transfer), the
Court should follow St. Joseph and hold that the Board's decision to deny payment for services
for the dates in question was not supported by the evidence and, thereby, reverse the Board's
decision.
B.

The County's Remaining Arguments Are Without Merit.

The County includes a section in its brief entitled "St. Luke's Analysis of the Statute's
Plain Language and Purpose is Erroneous." Resp't Br. at 10. However, as noted above, the
County fails to actually address the arguments made by St. Luke's Opening Brief. Specifically,
the County does not reply to St. Luke's analysis of the use of the affirmative verb "are" or
attempt to rebut St. Luke's arguments regarding construction of the statute as a whole or
legislative intent. See App. Op. Br. at 8-20. The County also fails to address the fact that under
the EMTLA, St. Luke's legally could not transfer the Patient without there being a facility
willing to accept the Patient. See id., 15-16. This is likely because the County appears to rely
heavily on its brief filed with the District Court, see R. at 32-45, rather than respond directly to
St. Luke's Opening Brief.
Thus, instead of responding to the arguments made by St. Luke's, the County attempts to
suggest that because Idaho Code Section 31-3502(1 S)B( d) states that "[s]ervices related to, or
provided by . . . skilled nursing facilities" are not considered necessary medical services, the
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services provided by St. Luke's for the dates in question should be denied. See Resp't Br. at 6-7,
10-11.

However, this argument, like the County's argument regarding the availability of

services, relies on a hypothetical or theoretical scenario where the services provided to the
Patient during the dates in question were provided by or related to a skilled nursing facility. The
reality is that the services provided to the Patient during the dates in question were provided by
St. Luke's, which is an acute care hospital, not a skilled nursing facility.

Arguing that the

services could have, or should have, been provided by a skilled nursing facility is simply an
attempt to sidestep the reality that the services could not have been, and in fact were not,
provided by a skilled nursing facility.
Moreover, there is simply no evidence that a skilled nursing facility would have been
sufficient for the Patient during the dates of service in question. The Board makes no such
finding and Dr. Dammrose only opines that the Patient "no longer needed the services of an
acute care inpatient hospital." AR at 38. He does not state the services of a skilled nursing
facility would have met the Patient's needs. For example, the services of a long-term acute care
hospital ("L TACH"), rehabilitation hospital, or other lower care facilities may have been more
appropriate during the dates in question. Indeed, Dr. Dammrose says the Patient's care during
these dates was "rehabilitative" in nature. AR at 38. The fact is there simply is no finding by the
County that the Patient's needs could have been met by a skilled nursing facility, and there is no
evidence to support such an assertion.

As such, even assuming Section 31-3 502(18)B( d)

somehow applied to St. Luke's (it does not), there is no evidence in the record to demonstrate
that the services required by the Patient were services that could have been or should have been
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provided by a skilled nursing facility rather than a LTACH, rehabilitation hospital or other lower
care facility.
Finally, the County appears to respond to St. Luke's absurd results argument by arguing
that requiring the Board to consider the availability of services in making determinations
regarding the cost effectiveness of necessary medical services would result in hospitals being
"paid to any end."

Resp't Br. at 11.

In support of this argument, the County provides a

hypothetical scenario in which a "hospital could find that no one at a patient's home was
available to assist with discharge and hold the patient at the acute care rate for a period of days."

Id. Not only is this hypothetical scenario inconsistent with the facts of this case where there is
no dispute that the Patient could not have been discharged home, it is statutorily impossible.
If the hypothetical patient was appropriate to be discharged home and the hospital refused

or decided not to do so, holding the patient for additional days would be "primarily for the
convenience of the person, physician or other health care provider," and would not be a
necessary medical service. See LC. § 31-3502(1 S)A( d). Similarly, in this case, if treatment at a
lower cost facility was appropriate and actually available to the Patient, treatment at St. Luke's
would not be a necessary medical service because it would not be the most cost-effective service
available to the Patient. See LC. § 3I-3502(18)A(e). Thus, despite the County's hyperbolic
assertion otherwise, requiring services to be actually available to the Patient would not result in
compensation to hospitals "without limitation."
In sum, the facts of this case, rather than baseless hypothetical scenarios, are clear. The
services provided to the Patient during the dates in question were not provided by or related to a
skilled nursing facility; they were provided by St. Luke's, an acute care hospital. Further, there
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is no question that the Patient in this case could not simply be discharged to home, and that
treatment at a lower cost facility was not actually available to the Patient for the dates in
question.

See App. Op. Br. at 2--4, 12 & n.4.

Accordingly, as the only services actually

available to the Patient, the services rendered by St. Luke's were the most cost effective services
and, therefore, were medically necessary.

This does not mean, however, that there are no

limitations whatsoever on what services are compensable under the Medical Indigency Statutes.
Only those services that are medically necessary and "are the most cost-effective" are
compensable. Requiring actual availability of the services in assessing which services "are the
most cost-effective" does not remove that limitation. See supra, pp. 13-14, 7 n. l.

C.

St. Luke's Substantial Rights Have Been Prejudiced.

The County does not respond or otherwise argue that St. Luke's substantial rights have
not been prejudiced.

Thus, for the reasons outlined in its opening brief, see App. Op. Br.

at 22-23, St. Luke's respectfully requests that the Court hold that its substantial rights have been
prejudiced.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The County has not responded to or otherwise rebutted St. Luke's assertion that the plain
language of Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18)A(e) requires the Board to consider the actual
availability of services at a facility willing to provide those services in determining whether the
services rendered "are the most cost-effective" services. Instead, the County has attempted to
side-step the fact that there were no lower cost facilities willing to accept transfer of the Patient
by making unfounded factual assertions, by attempting to shift responsibility for making medical
necessity determinations to Dr. Dammrose, and by arguing that requiring availability would
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erase the statutory limitations on compensation for medical services rendered to an indigent
patient.
However, as discussed above, there is no factual support for the County's assertion that
St. Luke's "decided to keep" the uninsured Patient out of some financial motivation. Such an
assertion defies logic for multiple reasons including that St. Luke's paid for the Patient's
treatment at another facility and is not seeking reimbursement for doing so. Further, there is no
legal support for the County's assertion that the Board is bound by any legal conclusions offered
by Dr. Dammrose or for the County's assertion that requiring actual availability would erase the
statutory limitations placed on compensation for medical services. For these reasons, and those
detailed in its Opening Brief, St. Luke's respectfully requests that the Court reverse the Board's
decision and award attorney fees to St. Luke's.
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